made have increased now that more can be done. It is equally important to note that the matrix of these decisions has changed also. Societies are now morally more pluralistic than they were several decades ago, and it is, consequently, not always easy clearly to perceive the difference between right and wrong, particularly in situations that display radically new kinds of clinical intervention.
Moreover, though the ethical issues and dilemmas of contemporary medicine are frequently bound up inextricably with the unique circumstances of particular cases, other ethical questions, however they are resolved, exert a critical impact on the common good of nations and of peoples across the globe. The ethical issues raised by the goals and methods of preventive medicine, by resource-intensive innovations in medical science and technology, and by the correlative need to evaluate innovative as well as established treatments, are intertwined with matters of science, medicine, economics, law, and public policy.
The analysis and resolution of these macro ethical issues require a kind of interdisciplinary method and collaboration quite diUerent from the approach appropriate for the resolution of value conflicts at the bedside. We rightly expect that physicians will battle for the best interests of their patients. We face chaos, however, if those carrying responsibility for the good of the entire community fail to measure their decisions and policies against the community's governing ethics and the standards of distributive justice. That wide perspective accentuates ethical issues of a different kind and difficulty than those a physician encounters at the bedside.
A governing ethos encompasses what people believe and perceive to be of the highest importance. The critical question here is: how wide is the perspective we adopt to gauge the scope and depth of our responsibilities to other human beings? Though many are accustomed to the term" international law," we are, by and large, only beginning dimly to perceive that ethics transcends national boundaries..
We are a long, long "';'ay from full consciousness of BACKGROUND Allegiance has grown over the past several years for the idea that it is no longer possible to resolve the multiple and complex ethical issues of contemporary medicine by direct and simple appeal to the doctorpatient relationship. This is particularly true if that relationship is conceived exclusively in terms of the patient's trust and the physician's conscience. The shift today is away from this paternalistic model, however tolerable it may have been in simpler times, towards basing medical ethics on the doctor-patient partnership in shared decision-making. However, this dialogical model is not the whole story either.
The medical profession and society as a whole are at the bedside too, when individual physicians, patients, and families take decisions and make choices that implicate the foundations of community among human beings. A society's ethos and values are today more frequently at stake in the decisions and practice of health-care professionals than ever before in the history of the healing crafts. Rapid advances in the basic sciences, and parallel developments in medical technology, have vastly expanded the pathways of diagnostic and therapeutic intervention into the bodies and psyches, and into the lives of sick people. The number, kinds, and complexity of decisions to be • This report will also be published in the Bulletin of the World HealthOrganization,1989; 67 (4) .
Ethical Issues in the
Treatment of Cancer Patients * T wenty speakers from six countries (Canada, the United States, Japan, England, Holland, and Norway) presented 15 minute introductory lectures to lead the working group's 50 participants from nine countries into two hour discussions of five domains of ethical issues relating to cancer research and the treatment of cancer patients. The domains were: (1) telling the truth; (2) allowing to die; (3) euthanasia; (4)research; and (5) limited resources -hard choices. <Il Z o our planetary ethical responsibilities; a long way from realizing what the dictates of distributive justice mean when they are applied to the human community across the globe. The right to health care means at least a claim in justice to a fair share, and to a decent standard, of health, medical, and hospital care. It is, indeed, reasonable to argue that this standard can never be identical in all places, nor at all times in the same place. Nevertheless some disparities in the share people enjoy within communities and within a nation are clearly recognized as morally intolerable. Clearly there are terrible disparities in the share of health, medical, and hospital care that people receive within the international community.
But do we perceive these disparities as morally intolerable? Or do we perceive these disparities as tragic, and relatively unchangeable, facts deriving from nature's laws and the behavouriallaws governing relationships betweem nations?
Though science is largely transcultural, the human community has not yet developed a corresponding transcultural ethics. Some even fear that a so-called "transcultural ethics" could never be anything other than the imposition on some peoples of the ethical views of dominant peoples. Informed and voluntary consent has, at least since the Second World War, increasingly become a standard of doctor-patient and clinical research-subject relationships. Both physicians and patients, in a culture that places great emphasis on trust in the physician as an integral part of the healing process, may find an open admission of physician ignorance or uncertainty to be therapeutically damaging or even absurd. North American culture, for example, emphasizes the value of individual autonomy. Other cultures emphasize the value of the family and the community in resolving disputes and in decision-making. The approach to informed and voluntary consent may be quite different in each of these cultures. Sensitivity to the ethos and values of other cultures is an essential requisite of international collaboration in working towards an international baseline of ethics in science, medicine and health care.
Over four days of intensive discussion we renewed the experience of how difficult and simultaneously how exhilarating it is to discover where and why people of high moral standards and very different cultures and histories both differ and agree on matters of vital importance.
THE DISCUSSION

Truth
Deficient communication between doctors and patients isnot only a cause of anguish for those already burdened with more than enough suffering. That deficiency also sets the stage for ethical conflicts and dilemmas. These arise inevitably when decisions of vital importance have to be taken mutually by people who do not really know each other. Reduction of uncertainty and anxiety is one of the prime goals of lucidity in the patient-physician relationship. That reduction increases the ability of both physicians and patients to decide and to act.
Studies and anecdotal experience indicate that problems of communication between physicians and patients are frequent. These problems may arise from the failure of both patients and physicians to realize that truth-telling is a two-way transaction. The physician needs information from the patient, even for the accuracy of clinical diagnosis. That information is all the more necessary if decisions about appropriate treatment are going to respect the patient's strengths and weaknesses, hopes and fears, desires, interest, and life plans.
There is an essentially subjective component to truth-telling when physicians and patients are involved in decision-related communication about health and disease, life and death. The patient's truth may often not be the physician's truth and viceversa. A genuine relationship is the only space in which each will discover the truth of the other.
Though physicians and patients may say quite . different things to one another in different cultures, what is indispensable across cultures is the physician's ability to listen to patients sensitively, to grasp the patient's truth, and then to honour that truth, To be effective in therapy and support, physicians and care-givers have to be multi-lingual, masters, in a sense, of each patient's personal language.
This ability to listen and communicate is an eminent clinical skill. It has to be learned, preferably from those who are already masters. Mastery of this skill for listening and communicating should be valued for its high worth and rewarded accordingly in medical and professional schools.
Teaching the clinical skills of communication, however, should rest upon a solid basis of research into the multiple varied expectations and require-. ments of informed and voluntary consent in different clinical situations. We now face a dearth in the empirical research required to add precision to the currently general guidelines governing informed consent.
Life and Death Decisions
Over the past decade, people in ma~y countries have come to accept the notion that aggressive life support, that prolonging life to the bitter end, is frequently not the right thing to do. The ethic has evolved, and is now widely accepted, of allowing terminally ill patients to die with dignity. This allowance may involve withholding and discontinuing such interventions as respirator support, chemo- W therapy, surgery, and even assisted nutrition and hydration. Those in favor of euthanasia (active) argue that a rapid, painless death is more humane that the slow lingering that often occurs after decisions to withdraw active life support measures. Those who argue against any legalization of active euthanasia base their rejection on one or several of the following considerations: active euthanasia is in principle morally wrong; or it is against the basic tenets of medical ethics; or this act is unnecessary if adequate palliative care is available; or this act would invite us to reduce our efforts to organize adequate supportive and palliative care; or active euthanasia, if legally approved, would inevitably lead to abuse and to a social climate that would exercise subtle pressure on people to choose euthanasia when they really do not want to die now. Over the past several years, ethical and legal thinking' demonstrate the following stages of progression regarding decisions affecting the prolongation or ending of patients' lives:
1. Medical dominance: the physician decides. 2. A terminally ill patient may reject" extraordinary" means of life support. 3. A terminally ill patient may reject" ordinary" means of life support. . 4. A terminally ill patient may reject nutrition and hydration. 5. A non-terminally ill patient may reject ordinary medical care. 6. A non-terminally ill patient may reject nutrition or hydration. 7. A family may reject" extraordinary" life-support procedures for a terminally-ill relative. 8. A family may reject ordinary life-support mea-. sures, and nutrition for a terminally ill relative. 9. A family may reject" extraordinary" and "ordinary" life-support measures for a nonterminally ill relative. 10. A physician may help a terminally illpatient to end his or her life rapidly and painlessly. 11. A physician may rapidly and painlessly terminate the life of a patient who requests this. 12. A physician may rapidly and painlessly terminate the life of a patient who is unable to make the request. (These stages of progression come, with modifications, from Bernard Dickens' presentation. ) The representatives of various countries in our working group could not demonstrate consensus on this scale of progression. Few representatives were prepared to endorse all twelve steps.
We learned that though euthanasia -the rapid, painless termination of human life, deliberately done to release someone from pain and suffering -is not legalized in Holland, doctors who administer euthanasia will not be prosecuted if they follow certain rules, notably those set down by the Dutch Medical Association. Although euthanasia has been quietly practiced in Holland for many years, the discussion of this matter is now open in Holland, as is the practice.
The doctor need not be the one who directly terminates the life of a suffering terminally ill person. In the view of some, the person who seeks release from intolerable suffering should terminate his or her own life if he or she desires. When patients do not know how to do this effectively, the doctor can be instrumental in procuring the needed drugs to effect a rapid painless death.
A high court decision in Japan in 1962 identified a number of conditions (all of which must be met) to render euthanasia an acceptable exception to the general ethical and legal condemnation of homicide. 1. The patient must be suffering from an incurable disease, and death must be close at hand. 2. The patient must be in a state of intolerable suffering. 3. The purpose of euthanasia must be only to release the patient from pain and suffering.
4. If the patient is competent, euthanasia must not be administered without the patient's consent. 5. Euthanasia should be performed by a physician, unless circumstances render this impossible. 6. The patient's life must be terminated in a painless, humane fashion. Some representatives emphasized that the wish to die must always be looked upon as the patient's need for a better life. The question then becomes: what do patients really want when they ask to die? Even with optimal symptom control, profound suffering can be found in dying patients. It is incumbent upon doctors to relieve that suffering, which is often caused by poor communication. It becomes a problem for the doctor, especially if he knows the patient only slightly, to know what the patient perceives as a "good life" and" good death." When is the appropriate moment to let a patient die? A further question is then raised. Should doctors with poor communication skills have the power to decide that euthanasia is appropriate for those patients who ask to die? Some in favor of euthanasia emphasize that euthanasia should be considered only under three conditions: (a) only in terminal illness; (b) only in profound suffering; and (c) only if life expectancy is limited.
Under us and Canadian law, active euthanasia is a criminal offence equivalent to murder/homicide. Although the motive is compassion, the intent is still to kill, and cases are prosecuted. Legal thinking, however, could conceivably evolve in the following direction. Attempted suicide has been decriminalized in many jurisdictions-, Suicide is then seen as a liberty, if not as a right. People give power of attorney to others to ensure that what they want to do will indeed be done when and if they are no longer personally able to realize their desire and will. Could power of attorney come to cover active euthanasia in the law?
Those working in palliative medicine take a stand against active euthanasia because of their dedication to physical and psychosocial control of symptoms until the end of life. Patient needs at this time for support and comfort increase. This requires that skill be targeted to control of specific symptoms without killing the patient. It is only when symptoms are not under control that patients request euthanasia. A peaceful death should become the goal.
Pain is only a part of suffering. Adequate and effective palliative care comprises more than symptom and pain control; it dictates the need for compassion. This means the mobilization of persons who can help a patient carry suffering that would otherwise be intolerable. We are not now directing enough of our resources to this kind of care. There is a lack of balance between the proportion of resources given over to treatments that iatrogenically often increase a patient's misery, as compared with the resources directed to assuring a delivery of effective palliative care and palliative medicine.
Research
The leading speakers focused the attention of participants on a range of ethical issues in cancer research. There is uncertainty about what to tell patients who are being invited to participation in trials (Phase I trials) designed to evaluate safety and give evidence on efficacy of new therapeutic agents. One ethical dilemma is: how to be honest in telling them about possible toxicity, without losing patients to the trial, and without gaining their acceptance by raising false . hopes. In randomized clinical trials, disclosure to trial candidates may be inadequate, particularly when consent forms are incomplete or slanted to encourage participation There is a link here between clinical research and clinical care. In all clinical research situations, it is essential that the goals of care be clearly identified in the patient-doctor relationship. Otherwise, the patient's alternatives and choiceswill be obscured. As a consequence, a patient's decision to participate in a trial, or the patient's refusal to do so, may suffer from diminished awareness and freedom. There seems to be fairly widespread confusion among physicians and clinical investigators about the purposes and requirements of informed consent for participation inmedical research and clinical trials. Clinical investigators sometimes speak as though consent is something they need for. their research.
They fail to grasp that adequate information is primarily a need of the patient 'and a-moral require-ment of integrity in a human relationship. The goal of adequately informing patients and of seeking their voluntary consent is not primarily the protection of the investigator and his or her institution.
In the context of research with children, we were invited to recognize and move beyond the misconception that children reason as adults do, even if with less knowledge, but in fact have childish feelings. Rather the opposite is true. Children reason childishly and process information according to their developmental stage. Children, however, have the same feelings as adults do. They know fear of abandonment, fear of loss of control, anxiety, and the deep dread of non-existence.
Our discussion revealed wide variance in the practice of research ethics in different countries. In countries where there is a strong cultural bias against open communication about cancer, clinical investigators may find it very difficult to accept or achieve the i de~l s of informed consent espoused by their colleagues elsewhere. In some countries, clinical trials are being conducted without adequate scientific justification. Some countries overly emphasize the scope of therapeutic, privilege and may dispense with the need for informed consent when the clinician feels that informed consent is not in the patient's best interests. The examples mentioned suggested the need to revivify the principles of true voluntary and informed consent as articulated at Nuremberg.
Limited Resources
We experienced considerable difficulty in focusing on precisely who is or should be making precisely what hard choices in societies characterized by limited resources and seemingly limitless innovation. There was a general recognition that we cannot return to a simpler period when fewer decisions had to be made because less could be done for those threatened by crippling disease and death.
Proliferating health care technologies and services, as well as the high costs of medical care, neither one .or the other alone, are two major foci, and not the exclusive core, of the problems associated with limited resources.
Many participants voiced the contention that money is being wasted on treatments that cause suffering and bring the patient little counter-balancing benefit. There was a related emphasis on the need to evaluate the outcomes of treatments. There was considerable support fo; the idea of scientific rationing, that is, for a policy of restricting diffusion and access to those innovations that are based upon reliable knowledge about safety. efficacy, effectiveness, and appropriate indications.
Adequate assessment of technologies and services, though morally and fiscally necessary, will never solve all the problems associated with limited resources.
Difficult choices will always have to be made, since there is no possibility in open societies of ever totally matching resources to needs. Moreover, the perception of need evolves as new technologies and services become known. It is essential, in this respect, that people are adequately informed about what doctors can and cannot really do. One participant suggested, only somewhat jokingly, that we would all benefit from a new publication, updated regularly, that would precisely identify what doctors cannot achieve. This might contribute to the deflation of overly inflated expectations and demands.
If major strides are going to be made against cancer over the next few years, it will probably be in the area of prevention. Those strides will not be made if increasing resources are· not shifted from useless therapy to effective education and prevention. In many developing countries the chance for curing some cancers is slight and detection is often too late for prevention. The emphasis in these countries should be on pain and symptom relief and on the broad spectrum of palliative care measures.
RECOMMENDATIONS
As a preamble to recommendations one to five, we note that in dealing with persons who are very ill and / or dying, communication skills, especially honesty and compassion, are essential in the presentation of medical facts.
To communicate effectively, health workers require appropriate verbal and non-verbal skills. However, from our discussion, it appears that in many instances, such skills may be lacking. Hence, this problem requires attention.
We noted that doctors in particular need to possess and utilize this ability to communicate because of the pivotal role they play in the management of patient treatment and the coordination of the treatment team.
All of the foregoing should be tempered by the national, cultural and ethnic milieu in which such communication occurs.
In view of the foregoing, the Ethics Working Group recommends that: 6. Palliative, hospice and supportive care be recognized as an essential part of health care and be financed accordingly. 7. Only regimes of therapy that have been shown to improve survival and maintain quality of life should be incorporated in routine clinical care. 8. Phase III clinical trials of cancer therapies should include assessment of the quality of life of all subjects in the trials. 9. Informed consent to clinical trials of cancer therapies should include clear statements of the expected effects of participation on the quality of the patient's life as well as a comparison with the expected effects of alternative therapies, including palliative therapy outside the clinical trial. 10. In view of potential benefits stretching into the next century, measures to apply existing knowledge to prevent the development of cancers should be widely promoted. 11. National medical research authorities should actively encourage clinical researchers in their countries to comply with accepted international guidelines, for example those of CIOMS, on the ethical conduct of research. 12. There be a legally enforceable duty to obtain the voluntary informed consent of the subject to all cancer research procedures. 1). Countries review their laws to consider allowing individuals to give advanced directives for their care in the event that they become legally incompetent and terminally ill. 14. Helping patients achieve a timely and dignified death should take precedence over mere prolongation of life. 15. Patients have a right to receive, and health care professionals have a duty to provide, adequate relief of pain; and that countries should review their laws to eliminate legal impediments to the achievement of adequate pain relief. 16. Studies be undertaken to assess the frequency of, and to determine the reasons for, patients' demands that their lives be terminated. 17. In the light of our recognition that we, as a working group, are unable to recommend for or against active euthanasia, countries establish appropriate task forces to study the issue of active euthanasia.
